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aBstract:.Descartes.claims.that.God.is.a.substance,.and.that.mind.and.body.are.
two. different. and. separable. substances .This. paper. provides. some. background.
that.renders.these.claims.intelligible .For.Descartes,.that.something.is.real.means.
it. can. exist. in. separation,. and. something. is. a. substance. if. it. does. not. depend.
on.other.substances.for.its.existence .Further,.separable.objects.are.correlates.of.
distinct.ideas,.for.an.idea.is.distinct.(in.an.objective.sense).if.its.object.may.be.
easily.and.clearly.separated.from.everything.that.is.not.its.object .It.follows.that.if.
our.idea.of.God.is.our.most.distinct.idea,.as.Descartes.claims,.then.God.must.be.
a.substance.in.the.Cartesian.sense.of.the.term .Also,.if.we.can.have.an.idea.of.a.
thinking.subject.which.does.not.in.any.sense.refer.to.bodily.things,.and.if.bodily.
things.are.substances,.then.mind.and.body.must.be.two.different.substances 
keywords:.Clear. and.distinct. ideas,.Descartes,.dualism,.God,.objective. reality,.
separability,.substance 
The.Cartesian.notion.of.substance.is.surrounded.by.mysteries.and.appar-
ently.unacceptable.doctrines .First,.Descartes.claims.that.mind.and.body.
are.two.distinct.and.separable.substances .One.might.agree.with.him.to.
the.extent.that.there.are.bearers.of.mental.properties.and.bearers.of.physi-
cal.ones .But.to.claim.that.these.are.separable.substances.is.much.more.
controversial .Second,.Descartes.claims.that.our.ideas.of.substances.have.
more.objective.reality.than.other.ideas .But.since.this.should.also.hold.true.
of.our.ideas.of.non-existing.substances,.it.would.follow.that.our.idea.of.
Pegasus.is.more.objectively.real.than.our.idea.of.Redness .Yet.this.does.
not.seem.to.be.true .In.any.case,.how.are.we.to.understand.the.claim.that.
reality.comes.in.degrees?.In.this.article.I.will.argue.that.such.difficulties.
may.at.least.be.mitigated.by.taking.into.account.how.the.Cartesian.notions.
of.substance.and.reality.are.connected.to.Descartes’.distinction.between.
confused.and.distinct.ideas .The.following.discussion.is.divided.into.six.
sections .First.(1).I.consider.Descartes’.claim.that.the.meditator’s.idea.of.a.
thinking.subject.is.more.distinct.than.her.ideas.of.sensory.qualities .I.then.
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(2).discuss.Descartes’.notion.of.distinctness,.(3).his.claim.that.our.idea.of.
God.is.our.most.distinct.idea,.and.his.notions.of.(4).substance.and.(5).real-
ity .It.will.be.seen.(6).that.an.idea.is.distinct.(in.an.objective.sense).to.the.
extent.to.which.its.object.is.real,.separable,.and.substantial 
1. The Meditator’s Idea of Herself
Descartes.emphasizes.that.what.he.is.establishing.in.the.Second.Medita-
tion. is. the.claim.that.we.can.have.a.complete.and.coherent.notion.of.a.
thinking.subject.without. in.any.sense.referring. to. the.human.body.(VII.
13) 1.He.introduces.the.notion.of.a.thinking.subject.as.follows .The.only.
thing.the.meditator.cannot.possibly.doubt.is.her.capacity.to.doubt.things .
To.doubt.is.to.doubt.the.reliability.of.one’s.judgment.about.something.and.
decide.not.to.rely.on.it .Hence,.doubting.involves.at.least.the.following.
activities:.some.activity.that.provides.content.for.a.judgment,.the.forma-
tion.of. a. judgment,. and. the.decision.not. to. rely.on. it .This. is.basically.
what.Descartes.lists.as.paradigmatic.instances.of.thought.(cogitatio):.a.res 
cogitans.is.a.res dubitans, intelligens, affirmans, negans, volens, nolens, 
imaginans quoque, & sentiens (VII.28) .The.doubting.meditator.does.not.
want.to.affirm.a.judgment.based.on.sense.perception.or.imagination .All.
we.know.by.the.end.of.the.Second.Meditation.is.that.there.must.be.some.
logical.subject.of.the.activities.involved.in.doubting 
However,.it.seems.that.this.logical.subject.need.not.be.a.substance .
A. logical. subject. is. simply.something.of.which.something.else.may.be.
predicated,. and. in. this. sense. redness,. velocity,. and.predication.are. also.
logical. subjects. (for. one.may.predicate. things.of. redness,. velocity,. and.
predication) .Also,.Descartes.has.clearly.not.shown.that.the.logical.subject.
of. thought. is.an. incorporeal.substance .The.thinking.thing.may.well.be.
identical.to.a.material.thing 
Descartes. is. well. aware. that. both. claims,. i e . that. the. subject. of.
thought.is.a.substance,.and.that.it.is.an.immaterial.one,.require.more.argu-
ment .He.does.not.even.use.the.term.“substance”.in.the.Second.Meditation.
(cf .Marion,.1996:.112),.and.all.he.claims.to.have.shown.here.is.that.there.
must.be.a.logical.subject.of.thought,.and.that.the.notion.which.this.subject.
has.of.herself.must.be.more.distinct.than.her.notions.of.material.things .
He.establishes.the.latter.claim.in.the.concluding.sections.of.the.Second.
Meditation 
Descartes.first.points.out.that.the.idea.of.a.logical.subject.of.sensory.
qualities.cannot.be.directly.conveyed.by.the.senses .What.our.senses.per-
1.This.refers.to.Volume.VII,.page.13.of.the.Oeuvres de Descartes,.edited.by.Charles.
Adam.and.Paul.Tannery.(Paris,.1996) .I.will.follow.this.convention.throughout.the.paper 
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ceive.are.only.qualities,.and.the.logical.subject.of.such.qualities.is.not.a.
further.quality .(If.it.were,.it.would.have.to.be.a.quality.of.some.further.
logical.subject,.which.would.either.be.unperceivable.or,.again,.a.quality.
of.some.further.subject ).Yet,.in.fact,.we.do.not.perceive.mere.properties;.
we.always.perceive. things. that.have.properties,.by.virtue.of. these.very.
properties 2.Hence.Descartes.concludes.that.the.perception.of.sensory.ob-
jects.must.involve.more.than.a.mere.affection.of.the.senses;.it.must.also.
involve.something.that.the.thinking.subject.does .From.this.it.follows.that.
whenever.we.perceive.sensory.objects,.there.must.also.be.thought .Any.
perception.of.a.subject.of.sensory.qualities.involves.thinking .Moreover,.
where.there.is.thinking,.there.must.also.be.a.subject.of.thought .(This.does.
not.prove.that.there.can.be.no.sensory.quality.in.the.absence.of.a.thinking.
subject .Rather,.it.proves.that.only.thinking.subjects,.and.not.merely.sens-
ing.ones,.can.have.the.idea.of.a.bearer.of.sensory.qualities )
Taking.a.further.step,.Descartes.concludes.that.the.meditator’s.notion.
of.herself.as.a.thinking.thing.must,.therefore,.be.more.distinct.than.any.of.
her.notions.of.sensory.objects:
If.the.perception.of.wax.appears.to.be.more.distinct.when.it.is.conveyed.not.
only.by.the.sense.of.sight.and.touch.but.by.several.causes,.how.much.more.
distinctly.must.I.then.admittedly.know.myself;.since.all.reasons.that.could.
support.the.perception.of.the.wax.or.of.any.other.bodily.thing.prove.more.
evidently.the.nature.of.my.mind!.(VII.33)
This.passage.may.be.understood.in.two.ways .First,.Descartes.might.be.
arguing.that.one.idea.is.more.distinct.than.another.if.the.former.can.be.de-
rived.from.more.different.sources.than.the.latter .For.one.thing,.however,.
it.is.not.clear.why.such.an.idea.should.be.more.distinct,.rather.than.more.
reliable.or.confirmed .There.does.not.seem.to.be.a.strong.conceptual.con-
nection.between.distinctness.and.reliability .Moreover,.Descartes.argues.
that.the.idea.of.a.pure.mind.is.more.distinct.than.the.idea.of.a.human.being.
with.both.bodily.and.mental.attributes .Yet.it.would.seem.that.the.second.
idea.stems.from.several.different.sources,.whereas.the.first.emerges.only.
in.metaphysical.considerations.such.as.the.Meditations 
A.second.reading.of.the.argument.may.be.given,.in.which.it.is.based.
on.the.following.principle:
(*).If.idea.A.presupposes.more.other.ideas.than.idea.B,.then.A.is.less.distinct.
than.B 
Descartes.would.then.be.arguing.that.since.any.idea.of.a.subject.of.sen-
sory.qualities.presupposes.the.idea.of.a.subject.of.thought,.but.not.vice.
2.For.the.general.principle.that.every.property,.mode,.attribute,.or.accident.must.in-
here.in.a.substance,.see.VII.79,.176,.and.222 
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versa,3.the.latter.presupposes.more.other.ideas.and.is.more.distinct .On.the.
face.of.it,.this.second.reading.is.not.much.more.plausible.than.the.first,.
since.it.is.not.entirely.clear.why.principle.(*).should.hold.true .In.order.to.
see.this,.we.need.first.to.ask.what.it.means.for.an.idea.to.be.distinct 
2. Distinctness
In.Principia.I.45,.Descartes.writes:
I.call.a.perception.clear.that.is.present.and.disclosed.to.the.attentive.mind,.
just.as.we.say.that.something.appears.clearly.if.it.moves.the.looking.eye.suf-
ficiently.more.strongly.and.manifestly .I.call.a.perception.distinct.if,.given.
that. it. is.clear,. it. is.clear-cut.and.separate.from.others,.such.that. it.plainly.
contains.nothing.but.what.is.clear .(VIIIA.22)
A.perception.is.clear.to.the.extent.to.which.its.proper.content.is.mani-
fest,.and.distinct. if. its.manifest.content. is.clearly.separate.from.what. is.
either.not.its.content.or.not.manifest .In.order.to.understand.this.notion.of.
distinctness,.one.needs.to.distinguish.between.two.kinds.of.content.of.a.
perception .I.will.refer.to.these.as.(1).proper.and.(2).presupposed.content 4.
A.perception.is.distinct.if.its.proper.content.is.separate.from.its.presup-
posed.content 
The.Logic of Port Royal.also.distinguishes.between.confusedness.and.
distinctness.with.regard.to.the.two.kinds.of.content.of.ideas.(Arnauld.and.
Nicole,. 1992) 5.Arnauld. and. Nicole. distinguish. between. different. parts.
of. certain. ideas. that. signify. in. either. a. confused. or. a. distinct. way . For.
instance,
‘the.white’.confusedly.signifies.a.body,.and.distinctly.its.whiteness;.‘Aris-
totle’s.opinion’ confusedly.signifies.some.opinion,.thought,.or.doctrine,.and.
distinctly.the.relatedness.of.this.thought.to.Aristotle,.to.whom.it.is.attributed .
(1 8:.61;.cf .2 1:.96)
3.There.are,.according.to.Descartes,.at.least.a.few.thoughts.that.do.not.require.sensory.
input.in.any.way;.the.object.of.such.ideas.is.either.God.or.the.soul.(cf .VII.73,.VII.358–9.
and.XI.342–3) 
4.Gewirth.(1943:.24).draws.a.similar.distinction.between.direct.and.interpretive.con-
tent,.and.claims.that.an.idea.is.distinct.if.both.contents.are.identical .However,.whether.the.
direct.content.of.an.idea.differs.from.its.interpretive.content.depends.exclusively.on.how.
one.interprets.it .Therefore,.Gewirth.cannot.distinguish.between.subjective.and.objective.
distinctness.as.I.will.do.below 
5.Note.that.Arnauld.and.Nicole’s.account.of.distinctness.differs.from.Descartes’.in.
important.respects .They.identify.clarity.and.distinctness.(1 9:.63).and.call.the.notion.of.a.
res.“tres-confus”.(1 15:.92);.they.also.allow.for.the.case.of.an.idea.being.confused.because.
too.many.distinctions.are.drawn.(2 15:.155,.following.Seneca,.Ep .89 2) 
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The.noun.phrase.“the.white”.explicitly.mentions.the.color.white,.but.
it.is.understood.or.presupposed.that.this.color.must.be.the.color.of.some.
surface .What.is.presupposed.is.signified.only.confusedly .Likewise,.the.
noun.phrase.“Aristotle’s.opinion”.explicitly.mentions.the.relation.of.some.
opinion. to.Aristotle,.but.merely.presupposes. that. this.opinion.has.some.
content 
In.this.way,.one.may.distinguish.between.the.distinct.and.confused.
content.of.any.idea.of.a.property .Since.all.properties.are.necessarily.prop-
erties.of.something,.their.presence.presupposes.the.presence.of.a.property.
bearer;.but.they.are.not.ideas.of.such.a.property.bearer .Hence,.they.refer.
to.this.property.bearer.in.a.confused.way .To.distinctly.conceive.of.such.
an.idea.is. to.focus.exclusively.on.its.proper.rather.than.its.presupposed.
content.(cf .VII.46) 
In.this.sense,.a.distinct.perception.is.not.distinct.in.itself,.but.only.by.
being.considered.in.such.a.way.that.its.clear.content.is.separated.from.the.
rest .Distinctness.is.only.a.matter.of.how.we.interpret.our.perceptions,.and.
two.perceptions.with.exactly.the.same.content.may.differ.in.their.distinct-
ness,.depending.on.how.they.are.conceived.(Gewirth,.1943:.23) .I.will.call.
this.subjective.distinctness 
Descartes.often.uses.the.notion.of.distinctness.in.an.objective.sense .
For.instance,.he.writes.that.it.is.sometimes.not.easy.to.tell.which.of.our.
ideas.are.distinct.(VI.33,.cf .Gewirth,.1943:.18) .If.distinctness.were.only.
a.matter.of.how.we.conceive.of.a.perception,.this.would.not.be.difficult;.
for.even.if.we.know.nothing.else,.at.least.we.know.how.we.perceive.things.
(VII.29) .Further,.Descartes.often.refers.to.distinct.ideas.simply.by.citing.
their.content:.he.claims.that.the.idea.of.God.is.more.distinct.than.any.other.
idea,.apparently.regardless.of.how.it.is.conceived.(VII.46) .There.seem.to.
be.certain.ideas.that.are.simply.more.distinct.than.others .However,.it.is.
not.at.all.clear.how.ideas.should.differ.in.their.degree.of.objective.distinct-
ness .One.might.think.that.the.degree.to.which.an.idea.is.objectively.dis-
tinct.is.the.degree.to.which.it.may.possibly.be.rendered.distinct .Although.
I.will.argue.that.this.is.not.quite.what.Descartes.means,.let.me.first.cite.
some.evidence.in.favor.of.this.account 
The.opposite.of.distinctness.is.confusedness;.and.if.perceptions.dif-
fer.in.the.degree.to.which.they.may.be.rendered.distinct,.there.should.be.
ideas.that.are.necessarily.confused.to.a.certain.extent .And.indeed,.sensory.
impressions.and.feelings.seem.to.be.necessarily.confused.(VII.43) .Such.
phenomena.involve.both.body.and.mind,.and.so.it.seems.they.cannot.be.
conceived.in.a.perfectly.distinct.way .Notions.of.unity.(of.body.and.mind).
have.more.presupposed.content.than.ideas.of.sensory.qualities,.since.they.
presuppose.not.just.one.property.bearer,.but.two.–.unity.is.an.accident.of.
both.united. items. (VII.435;.Hoffman.1990) .According. to.principle. (*).
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above,.this.should.mean.that.notions.of.unity.are.even.less.distinct.than.
ideas.of. sensory.qualities .The. following.observation. seems. to. confirm.
this .Descartes.sometimes.divides.all.notions.into.three.classes:.those.per-
taining.exclusively.to.the.mind;.those.pertaining.exclusively.to.extended.
things;.and.those.describing.the.way.in.which.mind.and.body.are.united.
(III.665) .In.Principia.I.54,.however,.he.mentions.only.two.kinds.of.dis-
tinct.notions:
And.therefore.we.can.easily.have.two.clear.and.distinct.notions.or.ideas:.one.
of.the.created.thinking.substance,.the.other.of.bodily.substances;.if.we.care-
fully.separate.all.attributes.of.thought.from.attributes.of.extension .(VIIIA.
25–26)
Thus.it.may.seem.that.all.notions.pertaining.to.the.unity.of.body.and.mind.
are.not.distinct,.but.rather.necessarily.confused .They.must.be.confused,.it.
seems,.since.they.lump.body.and.mind.together 
Accordingly,.one.might.argue.that.for.a.notion,.idea,.or.perception.to.
be.objectively.distinct.is.for.it.to.be.separable.from.other.notions,.ideas,.
and.perceptions .This.would.explain.why. ideas.of. sensory.qualities.are.
less.distinct.than.ideas.of.substances:.the.first.cannot.be.separated.from.
the.second,.whereas.the.second.may.be.separated.from.the.first .(Every.
sensory.quality.must.be.a.quality.of.something,.but. there.can.be. things.
without.sensory.qualities ).Therefore,.a.notion.of.how.mind.and.body.are.
related.cannot.be.very.distinct,.since.it.cannot.be.separated.from.the.two.
notions.of.the.united.things,.i e .the.mind.and.the.body 
However,.we.cannot. attribute. to.Descartes. an. account.of.objective.
distinctness.according.to.which.there.are.necessarily.confused.ideas .The.
problem.is.that.Descartes.does.claim,.in.a.letter.to.Princess.Elisabeth,.that.
there.is.a.way.of.considering.notions.of.unity.apart.from.the.notions.of.the.
united.things .One.can.“conceive.of.the.notions.that.belong.to.the.union.
of.body.and.mind.apart.from.those.which.belong.only.to.the.body.or.only.
to.the.mind”.(III.666) 6.Hence,.there.is.a.way.of.distinguishing.the.proper.
content.of.notions.of.unity.from.the.content.they.presuppose .Our.ideas.
of.how.body.and.mind.are.united.have.clear.content,.and.it.is.possible.to.
focus.on.this.exclusively 
This.raises.the.following.problem .First,.Descartes.writes.that.to.dis-
tinctly.conceive.of.an.idea.is.to.separate.its.proper.content.from.all.content.
really.belonging.to.other.ideas .Second,.the.suggestion.being.considered.
here.is.that.an.idea.may.be.called.objectively.distinct.if.it.is.possible.to.
6.In.VIIIA.22,.Descartes.also.writes. that.pain. is.not.always.distinct;.hence. it.may.
be.distinct .In.VII.83.and.Principia.I.66-70.he.implies.that.all.actual.confusion.rests.on.
misinterpretation 
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conceive.it.distinctly .However,.Descartes.claims.that.we.may.separate.the.
content.of.our.least.distinct.ideas,.namely.our.notions.of.the.union.of.mind.
and.body,.from.the.content.of.all.other.ideas .This.implies.that.notions.of.
unity.may.be.conceived.in.a.perfectly.distinct.way .Hence,.ideas.do.not.
differ.in.the.degree.to.which.they.may.be.distinctly.conceived 
But.although.there.are.no.necessarily.confused.ideas,.there.are.ideas.
that.lend.themselves.more.easily.to.confusion .The.idea.of.a.sensory.qual-
ity,.for.instance,.easily.leads.to.the.assumption.that.there.is.something.in.
the.world.which.possesses.it .This.is.part.of.its.presupposed.content;.and.
the.proper.content.of.such.ideas.may.be.confused.with.their.presupposed.
content,.such.that.they.are.mistaken.for.ideas.of.quality.bearers .Similarly,.
the. ideas. of. heat. and. weight. lead. us. to. the. assumption. –. mistaken. ac-
cording.to.Descartes.–.that.there.are.hot.and.heavy.objects.in.the.world .
Further,.we.are.inclined.to.think.that.the.weight.of.a.body.moves.it.down-
wards,.just.as.the.soul.may.move.the.human.body .This.is.a.confusion.of.
mental.and.physical.properties.(VII.441) .It.does.not.follow.that.ideas.with.
more. presupposed. content. are. necessarily. more. confused . But. they. are.
more.easily.confused.with.what.they.presuppose 
Hence,.one.should.define.the.notion.of.objective.distinctness.as.fol-
lows:
An.idea.A.is.objectively more distinct.than.another.idea.if.and.only.if.it.is.
easier. to.distinguish.A’s.proper.content.from.A’s.presupposed.content.(for.
instance,.because.A.does.not.have.as.much.presupposed.content.as.the.other.
idea) 
This.explains.why.principle.(*).above.holds.true .If.idea.B.presupposes.
idea.A,.but.not.vice.versa,.B.will.probably.have.more.presupposed.content.
than.A .Therefore,.B’s.content.is.more.easily.confused.with.A’s,.whereas.
A’s.content.is.more.easily.separated.from.B’s 
3. God
According.to.Descartes,.the.idea.of.God.presupposes.no.other.idea,.and.
hence.it.is.the.most.distinct.of.all.our.ideas .As.I.have.argued,.this.does.not.
mean.that.no.other.idea.could.be.equally.distinct.(in.the.subjective.sense) .
As.Descartes.shows,.one.may.derive.the.notion.of.God.from.the.idea.of.
thought;.and.this.means.that.the.idea.of.a.thinking.subject.has.some.pre-
supposed.content .The.existence.of.God.is.presupposed.by.the.existence.of.
a.thinking.subject,.and,.in.this.sense,.we.have.an.idea.of.God.even.before.
we.have.a.clear.idea.of.ourselves.(VII.45) 
That.the.idea.of.God.can.be.derived.from.the.idea.of.a.thinking.sub-
ject. does.not.mean. that. it. depends.on. this. idea . In.order. to.understand.
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Descartes’.argument,.we.need.to.recall.that.“thought”.is.a.general.heading.
for.all.activities.that.are.involved.in.doubt .In.his.proof.of.the.existence.
of.God,.Descartes.takes.up.this.idea.by.pointing.out.that.doubt.implies.a.
certain.limitation .A.thinking.subject.who.knows.everything.would.also.
know.that.she.knows.everything,.and.hence.she.would.have.no.reason.for.
doubting.anything .The.Cartesian.meditator,.however,.does.have.reason.to.
doubt.various.things;.hence,.she.does.not.know.everything .Further,.lack.
of.knowledge.is.a.privation.for.a.thinking.subject.(VII.54–5) .Whenever.
one.can.rightly.say.that.a.subject.does.not.know.everything,.there.must.be.
more.of.what.such.a.subject.could.possibly.know .For.to.know.everything.
is.to.know.everything.that.can.be.known,.and.not.to.know.everything.is.
not.to.know.everything.that.can.be.known 
Hence,.the.idea.of.a.doubting.subject.presupposes.the.idea.of.further.
knowledge. to.be.had . It.does.not. follow.from.this. that. there.actually. is.
a.subject.having. this.knowledge .But. the.notion.of.God.as.a.subject.of.
knowledge.is.dubious,.in.any.case .God.does.not.think.in.the.same.sense.
in.which.the.Cartesian.thinking.subject.does .Descartes.uses.“thought”.as.
a.label.for.all.activities.involved.in.doubting;.but.God.has.no.reason.to.
doubt.anything .To.be.sure,.the.fact.that.all.activities.involved.in.doubting.
are.thoughts.does.not.imply,.conversely,.that.all.thinking.involves.doubt .
Yet.it.is.at.best.an.open.question.whether.there.can.be.a.thinking.thing.that.
never.doubts .Further,.as.Descartes.sometimes.writes,.God’s.knowledge.
cannot.be.separated.from.his.will,.since,.for.God,.to.know.something.is.to.
bring.it.into.existence.(I.149,.IV.119) .Since.everything.is.at.once.created.
and.known.by.God,.he.cannot.be.mistaken.about.what.exists .Therefore,.
he.cannot.doubt.anything .To.call.God.an.infinite.thinking.substance,.as.
Descartes.does,.is.therefore.misleading .It.might.be.better.to.follow.Au-
gustine.and.identify.God.with.Truth.itself 
The.only.reason.why.God.may.be.called.a.thinking.substance.is.that.
this. is.how.he. is.known. to. the.Cartesian.meditator .God. is.known.as.a.
thinking.substance.because.only.the.idea.of.thought.(i e .all.activities.in-
volved.in.doubting).presupposes.the.existence.of.something.beyond.the.
thinking.subject .For,.as.Descartes.writes,.there.is.no.reason.why.it.should.
be.impossible.for.the.thinking.subject.to.have.developed.its.ideas.of.all.
corporeal.and.sensory.things.merely.from.itself:.“As.for.the.ideas.of.cor-
poreal.things,.there.is.nothing.in.them.that.would.be.so.great.that.it.could.
not.originate.from.myself…”.(VII.43–4) .The.only.idea.that.the.thinking.
subject. could. not. derive. from. the. idea. of. itself. is. the. idea. of. a. perfect.
thinking.subject.(or,.more.appropriately,.the.idea.of.God.as.Truth.personi-
fied) 
In.any.case,.the.idea.of.God.is.more.distinct.than.the.meditator’s.idea.
of.herself,.since.it.does.not.presuppose.any.other.idea,.but.is.presupposed.
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by.the.idea.of.thought .Yet.this.does.not.clarify.in.what.sense.it.would.be.
appropriate.to.call.God.an.infinite.thinking.substance;.and.indeed,.it.is.still.
not.clear.in.what.sense.the.mind.is.one .All.we.know.so.far.is.that.the.idea.
of.God.is.the.most.distinct.of.our.ideas .It.remains.to.be.shown.that.such.a.
distinct.idea.must.also.be.the.idea.of.a.substance 
4. Substances
In.order.to.understand.why.our.most.distinct.ideas.must.be.ideas.of.sub-
stances,.we.need.to.ask.what.Descartes.means.when.he.calls.something.a.
substance .He.gives.two.explicit.definitions.of.this.notion .The.first.occurs.
in.the.appendix.to.his.Second Replies:
Everything.in.which.something.that.we.perceive.(i e .some.property,.or.qual-
ity,.or.attribute.of.which.there.is.an.actual.idea.in.us).inheres.immediately.
as.in.a.subject,.or.by.which.it.exists,.is.called.a.Substance .Strictly.speaking,.
we.do.not.have.any.idea.of.a.substance.in.itself.other.than.that.it.is.a.thing.
in.which.that.which.we.perceive,.or.that.which.is.objectively.in.any.of.our.
ideas,.exists.formally.or.eminently;.because.it.is.known.by.the.natural.light.
that.nothing.can.be.an.attribute.of.no.real.thing .(VII.161)
This. is.basically. the.Aristotelian.notion.of.a. substance:. that. in.which.a.
property,.mode,.or.attribute.inheres.(Categories.and.Metaphysics Δ8). Ac-
cording. to. Suárez,. this. definition. of. the. term. “substance”. may. be. ety-
mologically.derived.from.the.Latin.verb.substare:.to.underlie.something .
That.something.underlies.another.thing.means.that.the.latter.may.be.truly.
predicated.of.the.former;.hence.one.can.say.that.something.underlies.an-
other.thing.in.at.least.three.distinct.senses .First,.a.thing.may.be.said.to.
underlie. its.properties.and.qualities:. they.are.exemplified.by. this. thing .
Second,.a.thing.may.be.said.to.underlie.its.kind:.the.kind.is.instantiated.
by.this.thing .Third,.a.quality.may.be.said.to.underlie.its.kind,.or.a.deter-
minate.universal.may.be. said. to.underlie. its.determinable;. as.when.we.
say.that.scarlet.is.a.kind.of.red .Scarlet,.however,.is.not.a.substance .One.
should.therefore.add,.following.Suárez,.that.“a.substance.underlies.the.ac-
cidents.such.that.it.does.not.require.a.similar.substratum”.(Disputationes 
Metaphysicae.XXXIII.1 1) 
As.at.the.end.of.the.Second.Meditation,.Descartes.emphasizes.here.
that.substances.are.objects.of.thought,.not.of.sense.perception .He.writes.
that.we.can.have.no.idea.whose.only.content. is.a.substance .There.are,.
accordingly,.no.pure. substances. in.Descartes’.metaphysical. framework .
He.consistently. refers. to.substances.by.way.of.what.he.calls.“principal.
attributes”.(Principia.I.53.and.63;.V.156) .Principal.attributes.have.a.spe-
cial.status:.their.ideas.not.only.presuppose.the.substance.they.inhere.in,.
but.are.as.close.to.this.substance.as.is.possible .The.idea.of.extension,.for.
14 Prolegomena 7 (1) 2008
instance,. presupposes. the. idea.of. an. extended. thing,.but. the. idea.of. an.
extended. thing.presupposes,. in. turn,. the. idea.of.extension .There. is.not.
even.a.clear.distinction.between.an.extended.substance.and.its.extended-
ness.–.extension.itself.is.extended .For.this.reason,.the.idea.of.an.extended.
substance.cannot.be.more.objectively.distinct.than.the.idea.of.extension .
Likewise,.the.idea.of.thought.presupposes.the.idea.of.a.thinking.thing,.but.
the.idea.of.a.thinking.thing.also.presupposes.the.idea.of.thought 
The.definition.of.“substance”.in.the.Second.Replies.involves.the.no-
tions.of.formal,.eminent,.and.objective.reality,.which.I.will.discuss.in.a.
moment .For.now,.it.is.sufficient.to.note.that.Descartes.does.not.suppose.
that.every.quality.must. inhere. in.an.actually.existing.substance . It.may.
also.exist.objectively,.that.is,.only.as.the.object.of.an.idea .Only.the.formal.
or.eminent. reality.of.a.quality. requires.a. really.existing.substance. (and.
the.formal.existence.of.an.idea.requires.the.real.existence.of.a.thinking.
subject) 
The.second.definition.of.“substance,”.which.Descartes.gives.in.Prin-
cipia.I.51,.is.more.akin.to.the.notion.of.substance.which.Suárez.derives.
from.the.Latin.verb.subsistere 7.In.this.sense,.a.substance.is.what.abides .
Descartes.writes:
By.substance.we.can.understand.nothing.but.a. thing. that.exists. in.such.a.
way.that.it.depends.on.no.other.thing.for.its.existence .And.of.course,.we.can.
think.of.only.one.substance.that.does.not.at.all.depend.on.anything,.namely.
God .We.realize.that.all.other.substances.cannot.exist.without.the.aid.of.God .
Yet.the.term.substance.does.not.apply.to.God.and.to.them.univocally,.as.they.
say.in.the.schools;.that.is,.we.cannot.distinctly.conceive.of.any.signification.
of.this.term.that.would.be.common.to.God.and.to.creation .(VIIIA.24)
According.to.this.definition,.a.substance.is.something.that.does.not.de-
pend.on.any.other.thing.for.its.existence .If.a.thing.depends.on.another.
thing.for.its.existence,.the.idea.of.this.thing.may.be.said.to.presuppose.the.
idea.of.that.other.one .Hence,.ideas.of.dependent.entities.lend.themselves.
to.greater.confusion,.as.there.is.more.content.that.might.be.confused.with.
their.proper.content .This.clarifies.in.what.sense.ideas.of.substances.are.
more.distinct.than.other.ideas:.they.have.less.presupposed.content 
These. two. definitions. of. a. substance. may. be. taken. as. referring. to.
two.different.ways.in.which.one.thing.can.be.said.to.depend.on.another .
First,.qualities.inhere.in.their.bearer;.hence.ideas.of.qualities.confusedly.
signify.the.bearers.of.these.qualities .Second,.something.may.depend.on.
something.else.as.the.cause.of.its.existence .It.is.in.this.way,.according.to.
7.Disputationes Metaphysicae.XXXIII.1 1 .Suarez.refers.to.Augustine,.De Trinitate.
7,.4,.9:.ab eo quod est subsistere substantiam dicimus .Cf .Flasch,.1986:.84:.“‘Wirklich’.
ist.danach,.was.bleibt ”
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Descartes,.that.the.thinking.subject.depends.on.God .The.thinking.subject.
is.not.a.quality,.mode,.or.attribute.of.God,.and.thus.it.is.a.substance.in.the.
first.sense .But. the. thinking.subject.depends.on.God.as. the.cause.of. its.
existence;.and.so.while.it.is.not.a.substance.in.the.strict.sense.of.the.sec-
ond.definition,.it.still.qualifies.as.a.substance.in.a.less.strict.sense,.since.
it.depends.on.God.alone.for.its.existence,.and.not.on.anything.else.(VIIIA.
24–5) .Qualities,.in.contrast,.depend.on.another.substance.for.their.reality,.
and.this.other.substance.depends.on.God 8
5. Reality
There.is.thus.a.hierarchy.of.ideas.in.terms.of.objective.distinctness.and.
presupposed.content .Ideas.of.sensory.qualities,.for.instance,.presuppose.
ideas.of.extended.substances.as. their.bearers,.and. these. in. turn.presup-
pose.the.ideas.of.thought.and.of.a.cause.on.which.they.depend.for.their.
existence .The.idea.of.doubt.implies.the.idea.of.a.finite.thinking.substance,.
and.this.presupposes. the.idea.of. truth .The.idea.of.God.presupposes.no.
further.idea .In.this.sense,.the.idea.of.God.is.more.distinct.than.the.idea.of.
a.finite.thinking.substance,.and.the.idea.of.a.finite.thinking.substance.is.
more.distinct.than.ideas.of.sensory.properties 
Descartes.describes.exactly.this.hierarchy.in.the.Third.Meditation;.but.
there.he.writes.that.the.idea.of.God.contains.more.objective reality.than.the.
idea.of.any.other.substance,.and.that.ideas.of.substances.in.general.contain.
more.objective.reality.than.ideas.of.modes.and.accidents .He.writes:
The.ideas.that.present.substances.to.me.are.without.doubt.somewhat.more,.
or,.as.they.say,.contain.more.objective.reality.in.them,.than.those.that.repre-
sent.only.modes.or.accidents .Again,.the.idea.by.which.I.conceive.of.some.
eternal,.infinite,.omniscient,.and.omnipotent.God.who.is.the.creator.of.all.
things.other.than.himself.certainly.contains.more.objective.reality.than.those.
by.which.finite.substances.are.presented .(VII.40)
As.is.well.known,.it.would.be.erroneous.to.suppose.that.ideas.with.an.
objective.reality.have.a.real.object,.or.are.objectively.valid.in.the.modern.
sense.of.“real”.and.“objectively”.(Cronin,.1987;.Wells,.1993) .In.the.scho-
lastic.terminology.employed.by.Descartes,.that.something.is.objectively.
real.does.not.at.all.mean. that. it. really.exists. in. the.outside.world .That.
something.is.objective.simply.means.that.it.is.an.object.of.something;.and.
ideas.may.have.objects.which.do.not.really.exist .As.for.reality,.the.fol-
lowing.passage.from.the.Sixth.Replies.is.revealing:
8.The.way.in.which.sensory.qualities.depend.on.the.thinking.subject.is.a.still.differ-
ent.one:.they.depend.for.their.existence.not.on.it,.but.rather.on.something.that.can.only.be.
grasped.by.thought 
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Further,.it.is.entirely.incoherent.to.assume.real.accidents,.because.whatever.
is.real.can.exist.in.separation.from.every.other.subject;.and.what.can.exist.
thus.separately.is.a.substance,.not.an.accident .(VII.434)
Real.attributes.are.assumed.in.order.to.explain.how,.in.the.context.of.
the.sacrament.of.Communion,.the.bread.changes.into.the.body.of.Christ:.
the.substance.changes,.while.its.accidents.remain.identical .However,.this.
is.possible.only.if.the.accidents.can.be.identified.as.the.same.before.and.
after. the.substantial.change;.and.Descartes.denies. that. this. is.possible 9.
When.he.says.that.accidents.are.not.real,.he.is.making.a.point.about.the.
way.in.which.they.are.individuated.and.re-identified.as.the.same .One.can.
only.individuate.accidents.and.identify.them.as.the.same.by.individuating.
and. identifying. their. bearer . For. instance,. two. different. slices. of. bread.
may.have.exactly.the.same.color,.yet.different.instances.of.this.color .If.
this.is.the.case,.the.two.instances.of.this.color.can.only.be.distinguished.
by.reference.to.their.bearer:.one.is.the.color.of.the.first.slice,.while.the.
other.is.the.exactly.similar.color.of.the.second.slice .This.is.the.sense.in.
which.accidents.depend.on.substances:.they.are.real.(separable.and.endur-
ing.individuals).only.because.substances.are.real.(separable.and.enduring.
individuals) 10
It. should.be.noted. that.principal. attributes.have.a. status. analogous.
to.Aristotelian. substance. predicates. or. Strawsonian. sortal. universals 11.
Whereas.accidents.are.individuated.in.terms.of.their.bearer,.attributes.are.
features.in.terms.of.which.substances.are.individuated.and.identified.as.
the.same .Attributes.are.not.accidents,.but.essences 
In.any.case,.to.be.real.is.to.be.a.separable.res,.and.accidents.are.not.
res .Accidents.are.not.real.because.they.cannot.be.individuated.in.separa-
tion.from.their.bearer .Further,.Descartes.assumes.that.there.are.degrees.
of.reality,.and.this.can.only.be.understood.by.assuming.that.something.is.
real.to the extent to.which.it.may.exist.and.be.individuated.in.separation .
Separability.is.a.comparative.notion,.since.some.things.are.more.separable.
from.all.the.rest.than.others 
Descartes.distinguishes.three.kinds.of.reality .The.most.basic.kind.is.
formal.reality.(which.he.also.calls.actual.reality;.VII.41) 12.If.reality.is.the.
. 9.As.Arnauld.points.out,.Descartes.denies.that.there.is.a.substance.beyond.the.attri-
bute.of.extension.which.might.change.from.being.bread.to.being.Christ.(VII.217–8;.cf .
VII.248–56) 
10.O’Neill,.1987:.231:.“It.appears.that.‘reality’.will.have.to.get.fleshed.out.in.terms.
of.some.complex.notion.of.relative.independence ”.She.refers.to.VI.35,.VII.138.and.VIIIA.
13–14 
11.See.Code.(1986).and.Strawson.(1959:.167–73) 
12. In. VII. 8. and. 232. Descartes. also. speaks. of. material. reality,. thereby. apparently.
confusing.his.own.terminology .For.a.possible.coherent.reading,.see.Kemmerling,.1996:.
39–42 
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same.as.separability,.then.the.formal.reality.of.a.thing.is.its.actual.separa-
bility .An.actually.existing.substance,.such.as.God,.a.thinking.thing,.or.an.
extended.body,.is.real.to.the.extent.to.which.it.may.be.individuated.and.
identified.without.individuating.and.identifying.other.things 
Ideas.and.thoughts.have.objective.reality.to.the.extent.to.which.their.
objects.are.real.(formally,.objectively,.or.eminently) .This.is.why.the.idea.
of.God.has.the.most.objective.reality:.God.is.most.separable,.hence.the.
idea.of.God.has.the.most.separable.object .But.the.object.of.an.idea.need.
not.be.formally.real .An.idea.can.have.another.idea.as.its.object,.or.it.can.
have.an.object.which.has.eminent.reality 
The.eminent.reality.of.a.thing.is.the.reality.(separability).of.what.it.
can.produce.without.further.assistance.(cf .O’Neill,.1987:.235–40) .For.
instance,.since.the.thinking.subject.can.produce.certain.ideas.and.thoughts.
without.further.assistance,.these.ideas.and.thoughts.are.eminently.real.in.
the. thinking. subject .The. degree. of. eminent. reality. which. a. thing. pos-
sesses.depends.ultimately.on.the.degree.of.reality.of.what.it.may.produce.
without.further.assistance .If.the.thinking.subject.could.produce.the.idea.
of.God.without.further.assistance,.it.would.have.as.much.eminent.reality.
as.the.idea.of.God.has.objective.reality;.and.the.idea.of.God.has.as.much.
objective.reality.as.God.has.formal.reality .However,.the.thinking.subject.
does.not.have.as.much.eminent. reality.as.God.has. formal. reality,.since.
otherwise.it.would.also.be.able.to.produce.God,.and.not.just.the.idea.of.
God 13.From.this.it.follows.that.the.thinking.subject.cannot.even.produce.
its.own.idea.of.God .There.must.be.something.other.than.the.thinking.sub-
ject.with.enough.formal,.objective,.or.eminent.reality.to.engrave.the.idea.
of.God.on.the.thinking.subject’s.mind 
6. Conclusion
We.can.now.tie. the.various.strings. together .For.Descartes,. substantial-
ity,.separability,.and.formal.reality.amount. to. the.same.thing .An.entity.
is.more. real.and.substantial. than.another. if. it. is.more.separate.or.more.
separable .Properties,.modes,.and.accidents.are.less.real.than.substances.
because.they.are.not.separable.from.substances .Instances.of.properties,.
modes,.and.accidents.can.only.be.individuated.by.individuating.their.bear-
ers .Attributes.are.as. real.as.substances .The.reason. is.not. that. they.are.
separable.from.substances.(for.they.are.not),.but.that.substances.are.like-
13.By. the. same. token,. the. thinking. subject. can.produce.without. further. assistance.
only.such.ideas.whose.object.is.the.thinking.subject.itself.or.something.that.the.thinking.
subject.can.produce.without.further.assistance .These.are.only.the.ideas.of.pure.mind.and.
pure.extension,.as.developed.in.the.Second.and.Fifth.Meditations .For.all.other.ideas,.the.
mind.depends.on.God.or.the.human.body 
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wise.not.separable.from.their.attributes,.and.are.individuated.in.terms.of.
their.principal.attributes 
Furthermore,.an.idea.of.a.more.separable,.real,.and.substantial.entity.
has.more.objective.reality .Ideas.of.substances.have.more.objective.real-
ity.than.ideas.of.properties,.modes,.and.accidents,.because.substances.are.
more.real.(separable).than.properties,.modes,.and.accidents 
Finally,.an.idea.which.has.more.objective.reality.than.another.is.also.
more.distinct .Ideas.of.properties,.modes,.and.accidents.have.more.pre-
supposed.content.than.ideas.of.substances,.and.thus.it.is.less.easy.to.focus.
exclusively.on.their.proper.content .The.idea.of.God.is.more.distinct.than.
any.other. idea,.because. it.has. less.presupposed.content. than.any.other:.
God.is.more.independent,.and.thus.more.separable.and.real,.than.anything.
else .Hence,.the.distinctness.of.an.idea.directly.corresponds.to.its.objec-
tive.reality:.ideas.with.more.real.objects.are.also,.in.an.objective.sense,.
more.distinct .This. is.why.Descartes.can.rely.on.principle.(*).above:. if.
idea.A.presupposes.more.other.ideas.than.idea.B,.A.is.less.distinct.than.
B .Objects.of.distinct.ideas.are.more.real.and.more.separable.than.those.
of.confused.ideas,.and.if.A.presupposes.more.other.ideas.than.B,.then.its.
object.is.not.as.separable,.real,.and.substantial.as.B’s.object .Based.on.this,.
we.can.answer.several.questions.that.have.emerged.in.this.paper 
First,.Descartes’.conception.of.reality.in.terms.of.separability.explains.
how.reality.can.be.a.matter.of.degree .Something.is.real.to.the.extent.to.
which.it.is.a.separable.res .In.the.strictest.sense,.only.God.is.real,.since.
only.God.is.separable.from.all.other.things.(there.are.no.other.things.on.
which.God.depends) .In.a.comparative.sense,.the.thinking.subject.is.more.
real.than.sensory.qualities,.while.the.latter.are.more.real.than.the.union.of.
mind.and.body 
Why.is.God.a.substance?.Descartes’.argument.for.the.substantiality.of.
God.relies.on.the.observation.that.substances.are.separable.things,.and.that.
our.ideas.of.them.are.therefore.objectively.distinct:.it.is.easier.to.separate.
and.clearly.distinguish.what.belongs.to.them.from.what.does.not.belong.to.
them 14.Descartes.shows.in.the.Third.Meditation.that.our.idea.of.God.must.
be. the.most.distinct. idea,.since. it. is.presupposed.by.all.other. ideas.and.
does.not.rest.on.any.further.one .Since.more.distinct.ideas.also.have.more.
objective.reality.(their.object.is.more.separable),.Descartes.concludes.that.
the.object.of.our.idea.of.God.must.have.more.objective,.formal,.or.emi-
nent.reality.than.that.of.any.other.idea .But.the.object.of.the.idea.of.God.
14.Note.that.there.is.a.certain.gap.in.Descartes’.argument.as.presented.here .He.starts.
from.the.claim.that.all.our.ideas.of.substances.are.objectively.distinct,.but.makes.use.of.
the.converse.statement:.that.all.distinct.ideas.are.ideas.of.substances .The.second.does.not.
follow.from.the.first;.however,.there.may.be.independent.reasons.for.its.truth 
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is.not.a.further.idea,.and.so.does.not.have.objective.reality;.and.the.only.
thing.with.enough.eminent.reality.to.produce.God.is.God.himself .This.
means.that.God.has.more.formal.reality.and.is.more.separable.from.other.
objects.than.anything.else .And.to.be.separable.from.other.things,.at.least.
to.this.extent,.is.surely.the.same.as.to.be.a.substance 
Why.and.in.what.sense.is.the.mind.a.substance?.The.reason.is.cer-
tainly.not.that.Descartes.conceives.of.the.mind.as.something.like.a.mate-
rial. thing,. as. Ryle. assumes. (1949:. 11–24);. for,. according. to. Descartes,.
material.things.are.less.substantial.than.the.mind .Rather,.the.reason.is.that.
if.the.mind.were.not.a.substance,.it.would.be.not.a.res,.but.an.accident;.
accidents,.however,.do.not.think .If. there.is.a.thinking. thing,. then.there.
is.also.a.thinking.substance .In.the.course.of.the.first.three.Meditations,.
Descartes.demonstrates.that.the.idea.of.a.thinking.thing.is.distinct.enough.
to.qualify.as.the.idea.of.a.separable.res .The.first.two.Meditations.show.
that.the.idea.of.the.thinking.subject.can.be.developed.without.referring.to.
any.other.substance. than.God;.and.the.Third.Meditation.shows.that. the.
idea.of.a.subject.of.doubt.is.not.separable.from.the.idea.of.God .Even.at.
this.stage,.however,.no.reference.to.any.other.substance.is.required,.and.
thus. the. idea.of.a. thinking.substance.depends.only.on. the. idea.of.God .
The.introduction.of.the.idea.of.extension.in.the.Fifth.Meditation.requires.
more.preliminaries,.while.the.ideas.of.sensory.qualities,.feelings,.and.the.
union.of.body.and.mind,.as. introduced.in. the.Sixth.Meditation,.depend.
on. still. other. ideas .The. series. of. steps. in. which. the. different. ideas. of.
substances,.attributes,.and.modes.are.introduced.roughly.mirrors.the.hier-
archy.of.separability .To.be.a.substance,.however,.is.to.be.independent.of.
other.substances;.hence.the.thinking.thing.is.the.second.most.substantial.
thing.we.can.imagine 
Why.are.mind.and.body.two.different.substances?.It.should.first.be.
noted.that.Descartes.does.not.claim.that.mind.and.body.are.actually.sepa-
rate;.he.only.claims.that.God.may.separate.them.(III.265–6,.VII.12–13) .In.
any.case,.to.call.the.mind.a.thing.(res).is.to.call.it.a.substance,.since.only.
substances.are.things;.and.to.call.it.a.substance.is.to.imply.that.it.is.sepa-
rable.from.other.substances .To.the.extent.that.a.thing.is.a.substance,.it.is.
separable.from.other.things.except.God.and.the.corresponding.principal.
attribute .If.the.body.is.another.thing.than.the.mind,.it.must.therefore.be.
separable.from.the.mind .Descartes.claims.to.have.shown.that.the.attributes.
of.thought.and.extension.can.each.be.grasped.clearly.and.distinctly;.and.
since.the.idea.of.an.attribute.is.as.distinct.as.the.idea.of.the.correspond-
ing.substance,.we.can.thus.have.different.distinct.ideas.of.mind.and.body .
Further,.the.idea.of.thought.is.more.distinct,. in.an.objective.sense,.than.
the.idea.of.extension,.since.the.idea.of.extension.is.not.among.its.presup-
posed.contents.(and.has,.in.turn,.more.presupposed.content) .This.may.not.
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be.true.for.such.modes.of.thought.as.imagination.and.sensory.perception,.
since.both.depend.on.the.human.body;.but.it.is.at.least.true.for.the.ideas.
that.Descartes.introduces.in.the.first.two.Meditations .The.ideas.that.the.
meditator.has.of.herself.as.a.thinking.thing.and.of.God.are.(objectively).
distinct.from.the.idea.of.extension .Our.idea.of.a.thinking.substance.does.
not.have.any.presupposed.content.other. than.the.idea.of.God .For.Des-
cartes,.this.implies.that.mind.and.body.are.two.separable.substances 
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